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Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and
Some Proposals for Legislative Reform
Robert Allen Sedler*
I. INTMODUCrION
The Supreme Court's liberalization of standing requirements, which
occurred primarily from 1968 to 1973, reflected the general liberali-
zation of its view of justiciability and its efforts to permit litigants to
vindicate federal constitutional and statutory rights in federal forums.'
In fact, standing had become so attenuated a requirement by 1971
that a federal appeals court noted that "[t]he Supreme Court's recent
decisions have made the standing obstacle to judicial review a shadow
of its former self, and have for all practical purposes deprived it of
meaningful vitality." 2 In the last few years, however, the Burger
Court, as part of an ongoing process of restricting access to the federal
courts,' has redefined standing in a way that significantly impedes
challenges to governmental action in the federal courts. In addition,
the Court has elevated its redefined standing doctrine from an essen-
tially self-imposed limitation on judicial review to the level of a con-
stitutional requirement under article III's case or controversy provision.4
This article will first discuss the liberalization of standing that
occurred from 1968 to 1973. Attentioai will then be given to the
decisions between 1974 and 1976 in which the Court-step by step
and seemingly imperceptibly-changed the constitutional test of
standing, promulgated in 1968 in terms of "personal stake," to a test
of "injury in fact." Additionally, the Court has imposed such a high
"threshold" showing of injury on plaintiffs seeking to vindicate fed-
eral rights that it has arguably precluded certain kinds of challenges
from ever being made in the federal courts. The final portion of
the article, after analyzing the power of Congress to remove the
* B.A. 1956; J.D. 1959, University of Pittsburgh. Professor of Law, Wayne State
University. This article is a slightly revised version of a paper presented at the
Conference on Access to Justice: A Response to the Burger Supreme Court, sponsored
by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Committee for Public Justice, and the
Society of American Law Teachers, held in Washington, D.C. on January 29, 1977.
1. See generally Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral Anal-
ysis, 25 VAND. L. REv. 479, 481-88 (1972).
2. National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 693
(D.C.Cir. 1971).
3. See generally SOCIETY OF AMERICAN LAw TEACHERS, SUPREME COURT DEN.AL
OF CITIZEN ACCESS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS TO CHALLENGE UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR
OTHER UNLAWFUL AcTIONs: THE RECORD OF THE BURcER COURT (1976).
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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standing barriers which the Court has placed in the path of federal
litigants, will present specific proposals for legislative action to achieve
this end.
II. THE STANDING REQUIREMENT
A. Liberalization of the Standing Requirement
Initially, it is useful to distinguish between a "private action" and
a "public action." 5 The former is a suit brought to protect the in-
terests, usually economic, of a particular individual or enterprise; an
example would be an action challenging an administrative ruling
that benefits a competitor. The plaintiff in such an action does
not differ from the plaintiff in an ordinary civil suit, notwithstanding
the fact that the plaintiff is challenging governmental action or seeking
to review an administrative ruling. The "public action," on the other
hand, is one brought by the "non-Hohfeldian" or "ideological" plain-
tiff.7  In practice, it is a group effort, and the suit will be backed
by group resources, such as those of the ACLU, the NAACP, or other
"public interest" organizations in order to protect group interests
and to advance group values that are infringed upon by the govern-
mental action. While particular individuals may suffer identifiable
injury from the challenged action-and in practice the lawyer will
make every effort to find "injured" plaintiffs in order to minimize
standing problems 8-the identity of the particular plaintiff previously
was not determinative. Recently, by applying the same principles of
standing to both types of actions, however, the Court has severely
restricted the use of the "public action."
One of the consequences of liberalizing standing requirements, as
reflected in cases such as Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,9 decided
5. The distinction was first developed by Professor Jaffe. See Jaffe, Standing to
Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 I-Ixav. L. REv. 255 (1961); Standing to
Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HAv. L. REv. 1265 (1961).
6. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 489-91.
7. See generally Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hoh-
feldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
8. The "standard plan" in suits challenging abortion laws, for example, has been
to include as plaintiffs a physician, a pregnant woman who had sought but was
unable to obtain an abortion, a married woman who wished to avoid pregnancy, and
other concerned professionals. The Supreme Court held that in such suits, only the
physician and the pregnant woman had standing. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
123-29 (1973) (physician could not obtain injunction against pending state prosecu-
tions; woman had standing although pregnancy terminated before Supreme Court
heard case); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 187-89 (1973) (physician, not subject to
pending state prosecution, had standing, as did formerly pregnant woman).
9. 390 U.S. 1 (1968) (private utility companies challenged TVA expansion of
sales; competitive interest alone can confer standing to challenge government action
where statute relied upon was designed to protect private utilities from governmental
competition).
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in 1968, and Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp 1o and Barlow v. Collins," companion cases decided in
1970, was to remove barriers other than the establishment of "injury
in fact" as the primary requisite for standing. Although Data Pro-
cessing and Barlow promulgated an additional test, requiring that
the interest of the plaintiff arguably be within the "zone of interests"
sought to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question, subsequent cases have not relied on this
additional litmus to deny standing.12 In Sierra Club v. Morton,"8 for
example, the Court held that a plaintiff could establish standing by
illustrating only "injury in fact," even where an organizational plain-
tiff was seeking to sue in a representative capacity. The Court
further emphasized that this injury could be slight and that it could
involve intangible interests, such as those that were "'aesthetic, con-
servational, and recreational."' 1" While standing was denied in
Sierra Club because the organizational plaintiff failed to allege that
its members were using the recreational area it was seeking to pro-
tect, 5 such failure was easily overcome by an amendment to the
pleadings, and the plaintiffs subsequently withstood a motion to
dismiss.'" There is no doubt that the "injury in fact" test, at least
as it was interpreted at that time, significantly lowered standing bar-
riers. Justice Powell, who has been in the forefront of the Court's
present efforts to reintroduce a more restrictive standing barrier, stated
that "[r]eduction of the threshold requirement to actual injury re-
dressable by the court represented a substantial broadening of access
to the federal courts over that previously thought to be the consti-
" 17tutional minimum ....
10. 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (plaintiffs challenged government ruling allowing na-
tional banks to provide data processing services; plaintiffs had standing because they
would be injured in fact by ruling and their interests were arguably within zone of
those protected by Administrative Procedure Act).
11. 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (tenant farmers eligible for agriculturdl subsidies had
standing to challenge government regulation adversely affecting their economic rela-
tionship with their landlords; Court recognized injury in fact and implicit congressional
intent that government protect interests of tenant farmers, bringing plaintiffs within
zone of interests protected).
12. Even when the "zone of interests" approach was in effect, it did not present
any additional standing problems in practice. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 486-87,
489-94.
13. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
14. Id. at 738, quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
15. See 405 U.S. at 735, 740-41.
16. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 348 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (motion to
dismiss denied but standing not in dispute). See also 405 U.S. at 735-36 n.8.
17. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976).
Although Justice Powell was referring specifically to standing under § 10 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), the test for standing to review
administrative action and for standing to review other governmental actions does not
19771
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The primary beneficiary of this liberalization of standing was the
plaintiff in the "private action," who could establish standing by
alleging that it was the subject of present or threatened economic
injury as a result of the governmental action." The plaintiff in the
"public action," however, was guaranteed standing ony when there
was no difficulty in showing that particular members of the group
whose interests were involved had or were likely to suffer identifiable
injury from the challenged action.19
During this period, F/ast v. Cohen 2 1 gave impetus to the "public
action." Although, strictly speaking, Flast held only that a federal
taxpayer could bring a suit alleging that an appropriation violated
the first amendment's establishment clause, of far greater significance
was the Court's enunciation of the "nexus" principle of standing =1
which required a logical nexus between the status asserted by the
plaintiff and the claim sought to be adjudicated.2 In F/4st, the
Court found that the plaintiff was "a proper and appropriate party
to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction' 22 because a nexus existed
between its status as a federal taxpayer and its claim that the expendi-
ture of federal funds to finance instruction in parochial schools vio-
lated the establishment clause. As long as federal funds were being
spent in violation of the establishment clause, the Court considered
it unnecessary to show that the plaintiff either suffered an "tangble
injury" from the expenditure or suffered any "injury" different from
that suffered by all federal. taxpayers.2 4
Carried to its logical conclusion, the "nexus" principle would author-
ize suit by any member of a group to challenge governmental action
detrimental to the interests of the group, without the necessity of
showing that the particular plaintiff suffered identifiable or differen-
tiated injury resulting from that action. Blacks, for example, would
be able to challenge a pattern of racial discrimination directed against
blacks as a group, or at least affecting blacks in the area where the
plaintiffs lived.2e Similarly, persons objecting to governmental in-
volvement in religious activity would be able to challenge such
involvement on establishment clause grounds, even if no expenditure
generally differ. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 489. Justice Powell continued to point
out that "as this Court emphasized in Sierra Club, . . . broadening the categories of
injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandon-
ing the requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an
injury." 426 U.S. at 39.
18. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 489-94.
19. See, e.g., the abortion cases, supra note 8.
20. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
21. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 483-84, 487.
22. See 392 U.S. at 102.
23. Id. at 103.
24. Id. at 102-03.
25. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 499-500, and cases cited therein.
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of funds were made.2 6  By focusing on the nexus between the status
asserted and the claim presented, the Court seemed to indicate that
"injury in fact" would not be required in the "public action," even
though it was the essential basis for standing in the "private action."
Justice Harlan implied that this was the thrust of Flast when he
argued in dissent that "public action" ("non-Hohfeldian") standing
should not be allowed in the absence of congressional authorization.27
In Flast, the Court also undertook to define the extent to which
standing represented a constitutional requirement pursuant to the
case or controversy provision of article III. Here the Court was very
precise: article III required (1) a plaintiff having a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy, and (2) a dispute involving the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. 28  As the
Court stated, "in terms of Article III limitations on federal court
jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether the
dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial reso-
lution." 29 There was no discussion whatsoever of "injury in fact,"
presumably because the Warren Court considered it a very different
concept from that of "personal stake." Thus, the Court implied that
although a taxpayer might not suffer "injury in fact" from the expen-
diture of federal funds for an unconstitutional purpose, there was a
sufficient nexus between a person's status as a federal taxpayer and
the claim that the expenditure violated the establishment clause to
give that person a "personal stake" that "impart[s] the necessary
concrete adverseness to such litigation so that standing can be con-
ferred on the taxpayer consistent with the constitutional limitations
of Article III." 80
The Court's interpretation of the article III standing requirements
in Flast was consistent with existing doctrine. The Court previously
had interpreted the case or controversy provision primarily with
reference to the adverseness of the parties,8' the prohibition against
feigned and collusive suits,3 2 the stricture against rendering advisory
opinions," and the requirement of a present personal stake in the
litigation as reflected in the mootness doctrine.84 Flast established
26. See Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973); Allen
v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Sedler, supra note 1, at 502.
27. See 392 U.S. at 130-33.
28. See id. at 101.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., the classic case of Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
32. See generally 13 C. WRUCHT, A. MMLFR, & E. COOPER, FEoERAL PRACTCE A
PnocrnunRE § 3530 (1975).
33. See generally id. at § 3529.
34. See generally id. at § 3533.
1977]
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that a case or controversy for article III purposes was presented when-
ever the plaintiff had a "personal stake" in the outcome of the liti-
gation. Additionally, it held that this personal stake was to be
determined by looking to the nexus between the status asserted by
the plaintiff and the claim the plaintiff sought to have adjudicated.
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,' decided in 1972,
the Court expressly recognized that the violation of substantive federal
rights created by Congress may result in "individual injury or injury
in fact" to those whom the statute was intended to benefit. Specifi-
cally, the Court determined that Congress, by virtue of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968,1" had created a substantive right on the part of
white persons to have interracial associations in a housing situation.
Thus, the Court held that white residents of an apartment complex
from which blacks had been excluded had standing, pursuant to the
statute, to file a claim of racial discrimination against the landlord. 7
These decisions embodied the law of standing as applied in 1973.
When the Flast test was satisfied, plaintiffs had standing unless some
other factor-such as that the claim was not presently ripe for deter-
mination "-militated against allowing it in a particular case. In the
"private action," and sometimes in the "public action" as well, the
"personal stake" test would be satisfied by a showing of "injury in
fact," even if it were slight and involved intangible interests.89
The liberality of the "injury in fact" test as it then existed, and
its applicability in the context of the "public action," was demon-
strated by the Court's 1973 decision in United States v. SCRAP,4
which held that users of a metropolitan recreational area had standing
to challenge an Interstate Commerce Commission order that permitted
railroads to impose a surcharge on freight rates.4 The plaintiffs based
their claim of injury in fact on the allegation that the surcharge
would discourage the use of recyclable goods, which in turn would
lead to the greater use of virgin materials and diminish the plaintiffs'
enjoyment of camping, hiking, sightseeing, and fishing in the area.42
The Court specifically rejected the argument that in order to show
"injury in fact" the plaintiffs had to be "significantly affected" by
35. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1970).
37. Filing a concurring opinion, Justices White, Blackmun and Powell emphasized
the importance of congressional fact-finding and noted that they would not have
found standing in the absence of the statute. See 409 U.S. at 212.
38. See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & CooP.R, supra note 32, at § 3532.
39. When the Court equated "injury In fact" with "personal stake" in Data Process-
ing, it did so in the context of finding standing in the "private action." Additionally,
the Court distinguished between a "private action" such as Data Processing and "public
action" such as Flast. See 397 U.S. at 151-52.
40. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
41. See id. at 689-90.
42. See id. at 678.
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the challenged governmental action.48  Additionally, for purposes of
the case or controversy requirement, it was not necessary to allege
"injury in fact" if the requisite "personal stake" was otherwise present
under the nexus test of Flast 4
B. The Burger Court's Retreat from Liberalization
In four decisions, Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War,45 United States v. Richardson (companion cases decided in
1974), Warth v. Seldin 4, (1975), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Organization 48 (1976), the Court has effectively revived stand-
ing as a formidable obstacle to judicial review. With only Justices
Brennan and Marshall of the present Court seriously disagreeing in all
four cases, 9 the Court has (1) replaced the "personal stake" and nexus
test with one of "injury in fact," and (2) limited "injury in fact" to
situations in which particular plaintiffs can show that they have suffered
or will suffer a specific present injury from the challenged action," and
that this injury is likely to be redressed if the court invalidates that
action.5 ' By so altering standing requirements, the Court has elirni-
43. The Court cited Professor Davis' article, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35
U. Cm. L. REV. 601, 613 (1968), for the proposition that "an identifiable trifle is
enough for standing to fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the basis for
standing and the principle supplies the motivation." 412 U.S. at 689 n.14.
44. In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), the Court held that the
mother of an illegitimate child did not have standing to challenge on equal protection
grounds the constitutionality of a Texas statute making it a crime for the parent of
only a legitimate child to fail to provide support. The Court noted that [t]he
prospect that prosecution will, at least in the future, result in payment of support
can, at best, .be termed only speculative," id. at 618, which seems to foreshadow
the "likely to be redressed by the invalidation of the challenged action" test of
Simon, see text accompanying notes 73-74 infra. It also based its decision on the
impropriety of allowing one person to challenge the nonprosecution of another. See
410 U.S. at 619.
45. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
46. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
47. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
48. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
49. Justice Stewart dissented in Richardson, and Justice White dissented in Warth.
Justice Douglas, who dissented in Richardson, Schlesinger, and Warth, had left the
Court when Simon was decided, and Justice Stevens did not participate in Simon.
Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred and dissented in Simon.
50. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 498-518.
51. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. at 44-46.
[I]ndirectness of injury, while not necessarily fatal to standing, "may make it
substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art. III: to
establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defend-
ants' actions, or that prospective relief will remove the harm." . . . Respond-
ents have failed to carry this burden. Speculative inferences are necessary
to connect their injury to the challenged actions of petitioners. Moreover,
the complaint suggests no substantial likelihood that victory in this suit would
result in respondents' receiving the hospital treatment they desire. [Cita-
tions and footnotes omitted.]
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nated citizen's suits 52 and has effectively ruled out taxpayer's suits ex-
cept in the precise situation of Flast,55 in which an expenditure of
federal funds is challenged on establishment clause grounds. 4 Thus,
by elevating the "injury in fact" test to constitutional dimensions, the
Court has significantly restricted access to the federal courts and has
strongly encouraged the lower federal courts to reimpose the standing
bar to the assertion of federally protected rights."
Schlesinger and Richardson were clearly "public actions." Neither
involved a claim of "injury in fact," since the plaintiffs were not alleg-
ing an injury distinct from that suffered by all other citizens and tax-
payers. In Schlesinger, the plaintiffs claimed that membership by con-
gressmen in the armed forces reserves violated the incompatibility
clause of article I.5" The lower court held that the plaintiffs' status as
citizens gave them standing to assert the claim.57 In Richardson, the
lower court, expressly relying on Flast, determined that a taxpayer had
standing to challenge a statute '8 that allowed the CIA to refuse to
account for its expenditures as contravening the taxing and spending
clause of the Constitution. 9 The Supreme Court, however, held that
standing was lacking in both cases. In Schlesinger, it reiterated the
"personal stake" test for case or controversy that it promulgated in
Flast but, without any further analysis or discussion, stated that "per-
sonal stake" meant "injury in fact," 60 and that "injury in fact," in turn,
meant "concrete" rather than "abstract" injury.61 Characterizing the
SCRAP, see notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra, would seem to be effectively
overruled or limited to its precise facts. See 426 U.S. at 45 n.25.
52. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-27
(1973).
53. See text surrounding notes 20-34 supra.
54. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). The nexus principle
of standing developed in F/ast is now limited to taxpayer's suits, which in turn are
limited to challenges to expenditures of funds as violative of a particular constitutional
limitation on the spending power.
55. The lower courts apparently have received the message. See, e.g., Evans v.
Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 797 (1977).
56. Article I, § 6, cl. 2, provides:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected,
be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States,
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments increased during such
time; and no person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
57. 323 F. Supp. 833, 839-41 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem., 495 F.2d 1075 sub nom.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird (D.C. Cir. 1972), reo'd, 418 U.S. 208
(1974).
58. Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. §§ 403a-j (1970).
59. Article I, § 9, cl. 7, states: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Ac-
count of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
time to time." See Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 851-54 (3d Cir. 1972).
60. See 418 U.S. at 218. As to the Court's citation of Data Processing in support
of this statement, see note 39 supra.
61. See 418 U.S. at 220-23.
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plaintiffs' injury as merely a "generalized interest of all citizens in con-
stitutional government," the Court held that this type of "abstract in-
jury" could not constitute "injury in fact" for case or controversy pur-
poses.62 Similarly, in Richardson, the Court found that the taxpayer
was asserting a "generalized grievance common to all members of the
public" and limited Flast to the situation in which the taxpayer estab-
lished that the expenditure of certain funds violated a particular con-
stitutional limitation on the spending power."3 In both cases, the Court
noted that it was unwilling to adjudicate claims of this kind, involving
a collision between the courts and the other branches of the federal
government, absent a showing of "concrete injury." " Additionally, the
Court asserted that the fact that no one would be able to litigate a
particular question, rather than militating in favor of allowing these
plaintiffs standing, "gives support to the argument that the matter is
committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the po-
litical process." " Thus, Schlesinger and Richardson have substituted
"injury in fact" for "personal stake" and "nexus" for purposes of the case
or controversy requirement and have established the proposition that
except in very narrowly defined circumstances, citizens and taxpayers
as such do not suffer "injury in fact" from the government's alleged
violation of the Constitution.
Having constitutionalized "injury in fact" as part of article III's case
or controversy requirement, the Court proceeded in Warth and Simon
to redefine "injury in fact" and to demand a showing that the rlaintiffs
had suffered or would suffer a specific and present injur ,from the
challenged action and that this injury would probably-not merely
possibly-be redressed by invalidating the challenged governmental
action. Like Schlesinger and Richardson, both Warth and Simon were
"public actions." Warth was a suit brought on behalf of low-income
and minority persons challenging a suburb's zoning practices on the
ground that they were allegedly designed to exclude such persons. The
Court held, inter alia, that low-income persons living in the area did
not have standing to challenge the suburb's exclusionary zoning prac-
tices since they could not show that their inability to obtain housing in
that suburb resulted in any "concretely demonstrable way" from the
questioned zoning practices.6 In addition, the Court denied standing
62. See id.
63. See 418 U.S. at 174-78. See particularly Justice Powell's concurrence, id. at
180-97. By so restricting Flast, the Court effectively precluded the use of Flast's
nexus principle of standing in any other context. See notes 51-54 and accompanying
text supra.
64. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179-80; Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 221-23.
65. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
66. Compare Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977). There, a black resident who alleged that he would qualify for
admission to a particular housing project, which a housing development corporation
19771/
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to builders who wished to construct low-income housing in the suburb,
since they were unable to show that any particular project was aborted
because of the municipality's restrictive zoning practices.6 7  The dis-
senting Justices lamented what appeared to them to be the majority's
intentional avoidance of the substantive issue:
[T]he Court turns the very success of the allegedly unconstitutional
scheme into a barrier to a lawsuit seeking its invalidation. In effect,
the Court tells the low-income minority and building company plaintiffs
they will not be permitted to prove what they have alleged-that they
could and would build and live in the town if changes were made in
the zoning ordinance and its application-because they have not suc-
ceeded in breaching, before the suit was filed, the very barriers which
are the subject of the suit.68
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization 69 was an
action against Treasury Department officials on behalf of low-income
persons, challenging an Internal Revenue Service ruling that made it
easier for nonprofit hospitals to avoid providing services for low-income
persons while retaining their federal tax exemption. Although there
was no question that the plaintiffs had suffered injury, since they were
being denied services by hospitals enjoying the charitable exemption,
the Court dismissed the complaint, considering such a denial insufficient
to establish "injury in fact" for constitutional purposes.70 Pointing out
that no hospital was a defendant,71 the Court noted the injury must be
one that "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not injury that results from the independent action of some third
party not before the court." 72 The granting of the exemption by the
Secretary of the Treasury did not constitute "injury in fact" because
the plaintiffs were unable to show that the denial of treatment was
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." According to the
planned to build in the suburb where he worked, had standing to challenge the
suburb's allegedly racially discriminatory zoning practices.
67. See 422 U.S. 490, 514-17. There were two other classes of plaintiffs: city tax-
payers, who claimed that as a result of the suburb's exclusionary policies they had to
pay higher taxes to support low-income housing in the city, and suburban residents
who claimed that they were being denied the benefits of living in a racially and
ethnically integrated community. The Court held that each of these plaintiffs lacked
standing because the challenged actions of the suburb were not unconstitutional as
to them and they were not entitled to assert the third-party rights of excluded city
residents. See 422 U.S. at 508-14.
See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977), in which a housing development corporation that had applied for a
zoning variance had standing to challenge the denial of the variance as racially dis-
criminatory.
68. 422 U.S. at 523.
69. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
70. See id. at 41-43.
71. Id. at 41.
72. Id. at 41-42.
73. See id. at 43-44, 45-46.
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Court, it was "speculative" both whether the denial of services to low-
income persons was "encouraged" by the challenged ruling and whether
the invalidation of that ruling would result in the availability of the
desired services; the Court found it "just as plausible" that the hos-
pitals would prefer to give up the exemption rather than provide the
additional services. 74
The real significance of Warth and Simon lies in their dramatic alter-
ation of the standing requirement; a few years before these decisions,
the plaintiffs' standing would not seriously have been questioned. Low-
income and minority persons living in a city located in a metropolitan
area, and builders desiring to construct housing for such persons in
the suburban part of that area, would have been assumed to have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of zoning practices allegedly
excluding the low-income and minority persons from those suburbs.
Similarly, low-income persons would have been assumed to have stand-
ing to challenge an IRS ruling that made it easier for local nonprofit
hospitals to cut back on the services they provided to the poor of the
area while retaining their federal tax exemptions. Certainly these
persons and the group of which they were a part had a "personal
stake" in the outcome of the controversy. Certainly there was a
"logical nexus" between their status as low-income persons and their
claims that actions of the government, allegedly in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, interfered with the ability of
low-income persons to obtain housing in a suburb or to obtain medical
care at a nonprofit hospital.
The standing bars that the Court imposed in Warth and Simon are
artificial ones; they deny access to the courts to interested groups of
persons whose interests are adversely affected by the actions they are
challenging. Even if the results in Schlesinger and Richardson can
somehow be justified on the ground that "generalized grievances"
should not enable citizens to invoke the federal judicial power, a view
that is strongly disputed by this author, certainly the plaintiffs in Warth
and Simon were not asserting "generalized grievances common to all
members of the public." In both cases, plaintiffs presented the partic-
ular grievances of a class of persons living in a designated area that
were directed against the specified actions of certain government offi-
cials. To say that the plaintiffs in these cases have not alleged "injury
in fact" is to retreat sharply from the substantial broadening of access to
the federal courts that was purportedly represented by the "[lreduction
of the threshold requirement to actual injury redressable by the court."75
Instead of broadening access to the federal forum, the "injury in fact"
requirement, as reinterpreted by the Burger Court majority, operates
74. See id. at 42-44.
75. Id. at 39. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
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to close the federal courts to large classes of persons seeking vindication
of federally guaranteed rights.
Given the Burger Court's present policy regarding access to the fed-
eral judiciary, the only immediate hope for broadened access lies in
legislative reform. The availability of this solution depends upon
whether Congress, if it so desires, can significantly lower or even com-
pletely remov the standing bar as imposed by the Burger Court. The
extent to which Congress can counteract recent judicial attitudes toward
standing is related in part to the Court's constitutionalization of stand-
ing within article III's case or controversy provision, and, more spe-
cifically, to its incorporation of the "injury in fact" test within that
provision. If Congress enacts legislation dispensing with the "injury
in fact" requirement or redefining that requirement in a markedly dif-
ferent manner, the Court may be forced to reconsider its own inter-
pretation if it is called upon to determine the constitutionality of such
legislation. Such action would be highly desirable because it would
permit the Court to realfze that it may have committed serious con-
stitutional error, which presumably it would then correct.
When the Court in Schlesinger equated "personal stake," the test of
case or controversy promulgated in Flast, with "injury in fact," it did
so without analysis or discussion.7 1 Whether this was due to inadver-
tence or design is of little consequence. What is important is that the
Court still has never explained why "injury in fact' has been raised
to constitutional dimensions. In the past, the Court has taken the
position that the case or controversy requirement must be interpreted
in an historical context.7  Referring to this provision, the Court has
stated that one touchstone of justiciability is "whether the action
sought to be maintained is of a sort 'recognized at the time of the
Constitution to be traditionally within the power of courts in the
English and American judicial systems.'" 71 Unless the Court has
76. The Court discussed this same equation in Data Processing; see note 39 supra.
While the "personal stake" concept of standing had been discussed earlier in Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962), it was substantially clarified in Flast. See
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218 (1974).
77. See Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Require-
ment?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 817 (1969).
78. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 533 (1962), quoting United Steelwork-
ers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 44, 60 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice
Frankfurter similarly stated:
In endowing this Court with "judicial Power" the Constitution presupposed
an historic content for that phrase and relied on assumption by the judi-
ciary of authority only over issues which are appropriate for disposition by
judges. The Constitution further explicitly indicated the limited area within
which judicial action was to move-however far-reaching the consequences
of action within that area-by extending "judicial Power" only to Cases"
and "Controversies." Both by what they said and by what they implied,
the framers of the Judiciary Article gave merely the outlines of what were
to them the familiar operations of the English judicial system and its mani-
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repudiated this historical interpretation of the provision, it is incorrect
in holding that the provision requires "injury in fact." Scholarly com-
mentary has demonstrated convincingly that the "injury in fact" stand-
ard cannot be reconciled with such an interpretation of article III.79
Moreover, as Professors Berger and Jaffe have argued, an historical
interpretation of article III would not require even a showing of a
"personal stake" in the outcome of the controversy, since the English
practice allowed "strangers" to obtain the prerogative writs of prohbi-
tion, mandamus, and certiorari to challenge illegal official action."0
"Public suits instituted by strangers to curb action in excess of juris-
diction," according to Professor Berger, "were well established in
English law at the time Article III was drafted." 8  Given this fact,
although the Court in Flast properly interpreted English practice when
it stated that article III required an "adversary proceeding," it was
incorrect in holding that an "adversary proceeding" required the
plaintiff to have a "personal stake" in the controversy, if a stranger's
challenge to official action was a proceeding "'historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution.' " 82
In any event, "personal stake," as defined in Flast, is something
very different from "injury in fact," particularly as the latter concept
has been redefined by the Burger Court. The essence of the case
or controversy provision is adverseness. This concept relates to what
have been considered the traditional components of a case or contro-
versy: the existence of parties, the prohibition against feigned and col-
lusive suits, and the stricture against rendering advisory opinions."' Be-
cause there is no logical or functional relationship between "injury in
fact" and adverseness, most commentators have taken the position that
"injury in fact" is completely irrelevant in the context of determining
whether a case or controversy exists for constitutional purposes.s4
festations on this side of the ocean before the Union. Judicial power could
come into play only in matters that were the traditional concern of the
courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways that to the expert feel
of lawyers constituted "Cases" or "Controversies."
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Professor
Berger, however, has pointed out that "the English practice on which Justice Frank-
furter relied did not in fact demand injury to a personal interest as a prerequisite to
attacks on jurisdictional excess . . . [since] we find that attacks by strangers on
action in excess of jurisdiction were a traditional concern of the courts in Westminster."
.Berger, supra note 77, at 817-19.
79. See generally Berger, supra note 77, at 817-19; Jaffe, supra note 7, at 1034-37.
80. See Berger, supra note 77, at 818-27; L. JA=, JuDicmAL CONTROL OF AD-
MINISTRATiVE ACTION 462-67 (1965).
81. Berger, supra note 77, at 840.
82. Id. at 827.
83. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra. As to adverseness in relation to
article III, see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696-97 (1974).
84. See Jaffe, supra note 7, at 1037-38; Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A
Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REv. 645, 672-74 (1973); Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1391-92 (1973). The con-
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"Personal stake," however, is useful in demonstrating the existence
of adverseness. The relation of personal stake to adverseness was
defined appropriately by the nexus test of Flast: the nexus between
the status of the plaintiff and the claim that is presented determines
whether the plaintiff has such a "personal stake" in the outcome of
the controversy as to furnish the requisite adverseness. Precisely
because of their status, for example, the plaintiffs in Warth and
Simon were adverse to the municipal officials who allegedly sought
to exclude low-income persons from the suburbs, and to the IRS of-
ficials who issued the ruling enabling nonprofit hospitals to retain their
tax exemptions while cutting back on services to low-income persons.
Similarly, in Schlesinger and Richardson, the status of the plaintiffs as
citizens " interested in the government's compliance with particular
constitutional provisions supplied the requisite adverseness for their
contention that these provisions were being violated. In any reason-
able sense of the term, the plaintiffs in these cases had a "personal
stake" in the outcome of the litigation. If that had been the test to
determine standing for case or controversy purposes, there would not
have been a constitutional bar to standing in any of them.
If the Court intends to abandon its historical interpretation of the
case or controversy provision, it should do so expressly. If it wishes
to adhere to that interpretation, on the other hand, it is inaccurate to
raise "injury in fact" to constitutional dimensions. Such an interpreta-
tion must then be viewed as an aberration which should be corrected.
III. A BROAD ROLE FOR CONGRESS
On the assumption, however, that the Court will continue to insist
that "injury in fact" is a constitutional requirement, it is submitted
that Congress still has the power to remove all the standing barriers
that the Court has imposed. The Court has expressly noted that
Congress can broaden access to the federal courts beyond the limits
which the Court itself has permitted."' First, the Court has recog-
nized certain nonconstitutional (or "prndential" or "self-imposed")
requirements of standing.8 7 These requirements include the 'zone of
trary view is expressed in Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An
Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 485-88 (1974).
85. Taxpayer status is subsumed within that of citizenship.
86. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 509.
87. By making "injury in fact" a constitutional requirement, the Court has sharply
distinguished it from these nonconstitutional requirements. See text accompanying
note 55 supra; see generally text surrounding notes 76-85 supra.
The Court has not expressly considered whether the "political question" doctrine
is a part of article III's case or controversy requirement or whether it represents a
discretionary limitation on judicial review. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 693 (1973); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1968); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1961). Professor Wright has argued that "[tihe non-justiciability
of a political question is founded primarily on the doctrine of separation of powers and
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interests" test,88 limitations on the assertion of rights of third parties,89
and ripeness.90 Second, the Court has stated that "Congress may create
a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can
confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no
judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute." 9' The creation
of a statutory right was the basis of the plaintiff's standing in Traffi-
cante.9 2  The Court has not taken a clear position on the extent to
which congressional power to create such substantive rights may be
limited by the constitutionalization of "injury in fact." In Simon, on
the one hand, the Court stated that the requirements of article III still
exist in situations in which Congress creates statutory rights and that a
"plaintiff must still allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even
if it is an injury shared by a large class of ... litigants." 9 In Warth,
on the other hand, the Court asserted that so long as this "distinct
and palpable" injury requirement is satisfied, persons to whom Con-
gress 'has granted either an expressed or a clearly implied right of
action "may have standing to seek relief on the basis of the legal
rights and interests of others, and, indeed, may invoke the general
public interest in support of their claim." "' Thus it remains unclear
to what extent article III will be interpreted as limiting the power of
Congress to remove the standing bars that the Court has recently
imposed.
There are two basic approaches that Congress can take in eliminat-
ing all these standing bars or, indeed, the requirement of standing it-
self. One approach would be to operate within the standing frame-
work to remove these limitations. The other would be to eliminate
the standing requirement in the "public action" by authorizing citizen's
suits on behalf of the United States to vindicate the public interest
the policy of judicial self-restraint." C. WmGsT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDmAL
COURTS 52 (3d ed. 1976). See also Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question:
A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 566-97 (1966). Compare this view with the
position that matters "textually committed to a coordinate branch" involve questions going
to the merits rather than to justiciability and that the other aspects of the political ques-
tion doctrine are discretionary limits on judicial review. See Jackson, The Political Ques-
tion Doctrine: Where Does It Stand After Powell v. McCormack, O'Brien v. Brown
and Gilligan v. Morgan?, 44 U. CoLo. L. REV. 477 (1973). At this juncture, at least,
there is no reason for Congress to assume that the political question doctrine is
constitutionally mandated.
88. See, e.g., Simon, 426 U.S. at 39 n.19.
89. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 509.
90. See, e.g., Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502-03 (1961).
91. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 514.
92. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). See notes
35-37 and accompanying text supra.
93. 426 U.S. at 41 n.22.
94. 422 U.S. at 501.
19771
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
in the enforcement of the laws and the Constitution of the United
States.
A. Operating Within the Standing Framework
Under the first approach, Congress could (1) remove all noncon-
stitutional limits on standing, (2) create a federal substantive right
to ensure that the actions of Congress, the President, executive officials,
and administrative agencies comply with the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and (3) authorize representational standing in
actions against state and local governments in order to protect group
interests such as those at stake in Warth.95
1. Removing Nonconstitutional Standing Requirements
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress, pursuant to
its article III power to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
can remove all the nonconstitutional aspects of standing that the
Court, in the "prudential exercise of its jurisdiction," has imposed."
Congress could accomplish this goal by enacting the following statute:
The federal courts shall exercise jurisdiction and grant appropriate re-
lief in all cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States wherein a case or controversy is presented between the plaintiff
and the defendant. In such cases the federal courts shall have no dis-
cretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction or to grant appropriate relief,
and shall invalidate any statute or governmental action insofar as such
statute or action is found to violate the federally protected rights of any
person.
Such a provision would eliminate, for example, the "zone of interests"
test, limitations on asserting the rights of third parties,9 and the re-
quirement of ripeness.9"
2. Substantive Right of Governmental Compliance
Congress could also create a federal substantive right on behalf of
all citizens and residents of the United States to ensure that all fed-
95. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See notes 66-68 and accompanying
text supra.
96. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 509.
97. For a discussion of asserting the rights of third parties, see generally Sedler,
Standing to Assert Constitutional Ius Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALEa L.J. 599
(1962); Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 H~Av. L. Rlv. 423
(1974). The Supreme Court has not yet retreated from its prior recognition of fus
tertii standing. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976).
98. In addition, the statute could provide that all limitations on judicial review
would be abolished in any case in which a case or controversy was presented, setting
out "including, but not limited to" examples.
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eral executive, legislative, and administrative officials comply with the
Constitution and laws of the United States. The creation of this
substantive right would be based not upon Congress' power to regu-
late the Court's jurisdiction, but rather upon its power to create claims
"arising under [the] Constitution [and] Laws of the United States." "
Proceeding on the assumption that the plaintiff must show "injury in
fact" for case or controversy purposes, the creation of such a substan-
tive right would require a legislative determination that American citi-
zens and residents suffer "injury in fact" from the enactment of uncon-
stitutional laws by Congress and from the violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States by the President, executive officials, or
administrative agency personnel. Congress might find that such viola-
tions cause American citizens to lose confidence in their government,
make them less likely to exercise their franchise, and otherwise cause
injury to the intangible "right of citizenship." 100 This would be a
reasonable determination, especially in the post-Watergate era when
continuing violations of law by such agencies as the FBI and the CIA
have contributed to a widespread loss of confidence in American gov-
ernmental institutions. To the extent that the Court's unwillingness
to allow citizen standing has rested on a desire to avoid collision be-
tween the courts and the other branches of the government, as em-
phasized in Schlesinger and Richardson,'0' this concern could be obvi-
ated by a congressional determination encouraging courts to invalidate
unconstitutional or illegal governmental action. 2 A statute creating
such a federal right might provide:
All citizens and residents of the United States have a substantive right
to compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States on
the part of the Congress, the President, executive officials, and admin-
istrative agencies. Any citizen or resident may maintain an action in
the courts of the United States against the United States or against the
appropriate officer thereof, challenging the constitutionality of any Act
of Congress, or challenging any action of the President, any Member of
Congress, any executive official, or any administrative agency as violat-
ing the Constitution or laws of the United States.
99. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This follows from the "necessary and proper" clause
of art. I, § 8, cl. 18, insofar as it gives Congress the power to "make* all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Covermment of the United States." Thus, there can be
no doubt that the United States has the power to create a substantive right in favor
of its citizens and residents as described in this section. The power of Congress to
provide "constitutional remedies" is discussed in the dissenting opinions of Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Black in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411, 427 (1971).
100. Professor Jaffe has analyzed the relationship between citizen's suits and a sense
of participation in the government. See Jaffe, supra note 7, at 1044-47.
101. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
102. See Justice Powell s supportive view, text accompanying notes 132-33 infra.
1977]
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
The legislative finding of fact would represent a determination that
the "generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance," 103
characterized in Schlesinger as constituting "abstract" injury,"3 should
provide the constitutionally requisite "concrete injury." Unless the
Court is prepared to alter its traditional deference to legislative findings
of fact,'05 such "concrete injury" would thus establish "injury in fact"
for case or controversy purposes. Furthermore, since violation of the
provision would also establish a "distinct and palpable injury" to all
citizens, it would not matter that the injury would be "shared by a
large class of . . . litigants"; 03 the plaintiffs would still be entitled to
"invoke the general public interest in support of their claim." 107 Thus,
the creation of such a right would overcome the standing bar both to
citizen's suits and to the "public action" in situations involving federal
officials.
The Court, however, might not as readily countenance the creation
of such a right to ensure, on behalf of all citizens, that state and local
officials comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
The Court may consider that the legislative determination of "injury
in fact" is somewhat more attenuated in this situation.l8 In addition,
Congress itself may be less willing to create such a right against state
and local governments than it would be to create one against the
federal government.
3. Representational Standing
What Congress clearly can and should do here, however, is to create
representational standing. Representational standing is analytically
based upon the assertion of third-party rights, which is subject to self-
imposed, rather than constitutional, limitations on judicial review.' 9
Representational standing meets the needs of persons who admittedly
suffer "injury in fact" from the challenged governmental action, but
may not be readily identified and/or may not be in a practical position
to vindicate their own rights."0 In Warth,"' for example, the allegedly
unconstitutional zoning practices caused "injury in fact" to some low-
income persons who, if the practices had not been in effect, would have
been able to obtain low-income housing. Similarly, in O'Shea v.
103. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974).
104. Id. at 220.
105. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964).
106. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975), quoted in Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976).
107. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
108. See Monaghan, supra note 84, at 1378, 1379.
109. See notes 86-87 and accompanying text supra.
110. Regarding "latent injury," see Jaf2e, supra note 7, at 1045-46.
111. Warth v. Seldin, 429 U.S. 490 (1975).
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Littleton, 12 where plaintiffs alleged racial discrimination against blacks
in the criminal justice process, some blacks would more than likely be
arrested in the future, and if the allegations were true, they too would
suffer such discrimination.
In cases such as these, as in "public actions" generally, the interest
asserted is a group interest, and some members of the group have
suffered or will suffer "injury in fact" from the challenged action.
Consequently, there would seem to be no constitutional bar to allow-
ing their injury to be redressed by an organizational plaintiff that
proposes to protect the interests of the group or class that it represents.
In discussing third-party standing some years ago, this author proposed
the corollary to such standing that "[wihere the rights of members of
a class are affected because of their membership in that class, an
organization which has as a purpose the protection of the interests of
the class . . . should have standing to assert the rights of the class
members." I's A suit by the NAACP challenging racial discrimination
is a primary illustration of this corollary, which could be the basis for
representational standing in a case such as O'Shea. Similarly, an
organization representing low-income persons would have represen-
tational standing to challenge discrimination against the poor in a sit-
uation like that in Warth. With the exception of the "injury in fact"
hurdle imposed by Simon, which cannot be overcome in the absence
of citizen standing, representational standing would significantly
obviate the requirement that particular plaintiffs show a particular
injury to themselves resulting from the challenged action. It would
allow the assertion of group interests whenever those interests are
adversely affected by governmental action.
In summary, Congress, using an approach that operates within the
existing standing framework, could enact legislation which would (1)
remove all nonconstitutional barriers to standing, (2) create a federal
substantive right to challenge the violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States by federal officials, and (3) establish representa-
tional standing to protect group interests from violation by state and
local governments.
B. Elimination of the Standing Requirement for the Public
Action
Under a second approach, standing itself would be eliminated as a
limitation on judicial review in the "public action." Citizens and resi-
dents would be authorized to challenge the validity of laws and gov-
112. 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (named plaintiff denied standing because threat of injury
too remote).
113. Sedler, supra note 97, at 653-56.
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ernmental action, not as individuals moved by their own interests, but
on behalf of the United States, seeking to vindicate the public inter-
est in the enforcement of the Constitution and laws of the United
States. Using this approach, it is not necessary for constitutional
purposes to distinguish between challenges to federal laws and gov-
ernmental action on the one hand, and challenges to state and local
laws and governmental action on the other. Authorizing citizens and
residents to sue in the public interest would avoid any problem of
"injury in fact" since the plaintiff would not be bringing the action as
an individual but on behalf of the United States, and therefore the
action would necessarily present a case or controversy. This is illus-
trated by prosecutions under federal criminal statutes, civil suits in-
stigated by the government under regulatory statutes such as the
antitrust laws, and suits that seek to vindicate federally protected con-
stitutional and statutory rights such as suits challenging racial segrega-
tion or employment discrimination.
The "case or controversy" requirement, however, does not neces-
sitate that such suits be brought by the "public" Attorney General.
It has long been recognized that Congress can authorize citizens to
sue on behalf of the United States as "private Attorney Generals," 114
which then presents a case or controversy in the same manner as if
the suit were brought by the United States itself. Suits by private
persons to' vindicate the public interest originated with the historic
"informer's action" and "relator's action" in English law "' and have
existed in this country "since the foundation of our government." '
Such suits are called qui tam actions 117 and depend on express con-
gressional authorization. 8 The False Claims Act,1 9 a present-day
example of the qui tam action, authorizes suit to be brought by "any
person, as well for himself as for the United States ...in the name
of the United States," against any person who has made or presented
a false or fraudulent claim for payment to the federal government. 120
114. The phrase was coined by Judge Jerome Frank in Associated Industries, Inc.
v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
115. See Berger, supra note 77, at 825-27.
116. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905). See also United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 nn.4, 5 (1943).
117. "Qui tam is the phrase used to describe an informer's action brought by one
who sues for the State or the United States as well as for himself." United States
ex rel. Vance v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 n.1 (W.D.
Pa. 1973).
118. See Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 84
(2d Cir. 1972) (qui tam action not authorized by Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899).
119. 31 U.S.C. §§ 231, 232 (1970).
120. According to 31 U.S.C. § 232(c) (1970), the party bringing the suit must
notify the government, and if the government chooses to prosecute the suit itself,
the private party must step aside,
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The statute imposes a civil fine, in addition to double damages, 2 1 and
provides for an award to the informer from the proceeds of the suit.122
Just as Congress may authorize qui tam actions by private persons
against other private persons to vindicate the public interest, it also
may authorize such actions against the government itself. In FCC v.
Sanders Brothers Radio Station,-m decided in 1940, the Court held
that a party who individually lacked standing to challenge the grant
of a broadcast license to a competitor 124 was nonetheless a "person
aggrieved" under the Communications Act of 1934 '2 and thus could
challenge the grant as a "representative of the public interest."' 2
Two years later, in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,2 7 the Court
again emphasized, despite the objection that "citizen standing" was
inconsistent with the case or controversy requirement, 28 that "[t]hese
private litigants have standing only as representatives of the public
interest." '29 As previously noted, since there is no question that Con-
gress has the power to create an "informer's action," "[Congress']
preference for encouraging private Attorney Generals to seek only
prospective injunctive or declaratory relief should not have any Article
III consequences." 10 Thus, there appears to be general agreement
that Congress has broad power to authorize citizen's suits brought by
representatives of the public interest on behalf of the United States.''
This power has not been questioned by the Court. Indeed, even
Justice Powell, a strong proponent of restrictive standing, has stated,
"The Court has confirmed the power- of Congress to open the federal
courts to representatives of the public interest through specific statutory
121. See id. § 231.
122. The Act additionally states that if the government prosecutes the suit, the
award cannot exceed 1/10th of the proceeds; and if the private party prosecutes the
suit, the award cannot exceed 1/4th of the proceeds. 31 U.S.C. § 232(e) (1970).
123. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
124. Today, this party would have individual standing under Data Processing.
See note 10 supra.
125. 47 U.S.C. 151-609 (1934).
126. 309 U.S. at 476-77.
127. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
128. Justices Douglas and Murphy, dissenting in Scripps-H6ward, argued that if the
Communications Act were construed as not creating a substantive right on the part
of the assailant, any challenge by the assailant to the action of the administrative
agency would not present a case or controversy for article III purposes. See id.
at 18-22.
129. Id. at 14. See the discussion of Scripps-Howard in Jaffe, supra note 7, at
1035-36.
130. 13 WiumH-r, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3531, at 237.
131. See Justice Harlan's discussion of this point in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
120, 130-33 (1968). Justice Harlan argued that because Congress had this power,
the Court should not on its own initiative allow standing in the "public action,' since
numerous unrestricted public actions would place a substantial strain on the judiciary.
See also Berger, supra note 77, at 839-40; Monaghan, supra note 84, at 1375-79.
Compare Albert, supra note 84, at 478-93.
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grants of standing." 132 Justice Powell noted further that ". . . objec-
tions to public actions are ameliorated by the congressional mandate.
Specific statutory grants of standing in such cases alleviate the condi-
tions that make 'judicial forbearance the part of wisdom.'" 18
Another modem illustration of a qui tam action against the govern-
ment is found in the provisions of the Clean Air Act.'M The Act
permits any person to commence an action against the United States,
against any other governmental instrumentality (including state agen-
cies) to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment, and against
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, in order
to enforce its legislative mandate."" The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has specifically held that the statute does not require any showing
of "injury in fact," and that standing as such is completely irrelevant:
The standing argument presents no barrier to plaintiff's action. Under
the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision, the general requirements for
standing have been relaxed to permit suits by "any citizen." In this
way citizens are recruited to serve as private attorneys-general to facil-
itate enforcement of the act in the face of official inaction. Appellants
responded to this Congressional invitation to invoke the judicial process
and assert the public interest .... It is clear appellants had standing
under the statute to represent the public.'3 6
The District of Columbia Circuit did not even discuss Schlesinger87
and Richardson,18 although they had been decided only a year earlier.
Similarly, the Second Circuit has recently noted that "the [Clean Air]
Act seeks to encourage citizen participation rather than to treat it as
curiosity or a theoretical remedy. Possible jurisdictional barriers to
citizens actions, such as amount in controversy and standing require-
ments, are expressly discarded by the Act." "'
In recommending that the citizen's suit provision be included in the
Clean Air Act, the Senate Public Works Committee stated that "[a]u-
thorizing citizens to bring suits for violations of [pollution] standards
should motivate governmental agencies charged with the responsibility
to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings."1 40  Likewise,
132. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 193 (1974) (concurring opinion).
133. Id. at 196 n.18, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 132 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (1970).
135. See id. § 1857h-2.
136. Metropolitan Wash. Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d
809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
137. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). See
text surrounding notes 45-65 supra.
138. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). See text surrounding
notes 45-65 supra.
139. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1976).
140. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970).
[Vol. 30
STANDING AND THE BURGER COURT
authorizing citizen's suits to challenge unconstitutional laws and in-
valid governmental actions should motivate legislators to enact laws
that are constitutional and also should motivate government officials,
from the President of the United States to the police officer on patrol,
to conform their conduct to the requirements of the Constitution and
laws of the United States.'
The authorization of citizen's suits would demonstrate both a strong
commitment on the part of Congress to adhere to the rule of law in
American society and to recognize the vital role of American citizens
and residents in insuring that the rule of law becomes a reality. Citi-
zen's suits will not be brought frivolously, since the cost of initiating
federal litigation is, indeed, quite high.142  They will be brought, as
they are now, by interested citizens and organizations, seeking to pro-
tect group interests and to implement group values that they believe
are protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States. The
only difference will be that standing will no longer present a possibly
insurmountable obstacle.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has explored the' Burger Court's reintroduction of the
standing bar. In four cases, decided between 1974 and 1976,48 the
Court has held that a showing of "injury in fact" is constitutionally
required by article IIrs case or controversy provision. The Court
has proceeded to redefine this term, limiting it to a situation in which
particular plaintiffs can show that they have suffered or will suffer a
specific and present injury from the challenged governmental action,
and that this injury is likely to be redressed if the court invalidates
that action. In so doing, the Court not only has eliminated citizen's
suits, but has also effectively ruled out taxpayer's suits in situations
other than those challenging the expenditure of funds under the estab-
lishment clause.1" As part of an ongoing process of restricting access
to the federal courts, the Court has reintroduced the standing bar and
again has erected it as a formidable obstacle to judicial review.
141. A discussion of the details of citizen's suits acts is beyond the scope of the
present article. The provisions of the Clean Air Act, however, might serve as a
guide.
142. See Scott, supra note 84, at 673-74: "The idle and whimsical plaintiff, a
dilettante who litigates for a lark, is a specter which haunts the legal literature, not
the courtroom." See also Monaghan, supra note 84, at 1397: "To recognize a citizens
stake in a constitutional principle and allow him access to the Court absent some
pecific complaint of injury in fact or effect on primary conduct need not open up
fodgates to frivolous constitutional litigation. But it is up to Congress to fashion
the boundaries of a model of judicial competence better suited to the Court's special
function."
143. See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 49-55 supra.
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Despite the Court's constitutionalization of standing, it is submitted
that Congress can exercise its power to lower significantly or even
remove completely the standing bar that the Court has imposed. If
Congress chooses to operate within the standing framework, it can
(1) remove all nonconstitutional limits on standing, (2) create a
federal substantive right to assure that at least the actions of Congress,
the President, executive officials, and administrative agencies comply
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (3) create
representational standing, which would effectively protect group in-
terests by allowing them to be asserted in actions against state and
local governments by an organization having as a purpose the protec-
tion of those abridged interests.
More significantly, Congress can eliminate standing itself as a limita-
tion on judicial review in the "public action" by authorizing individuals
to bring qui tam suits on behalf of the United States to challenge any
governmental action considered violative of the Constitution or laws
of the United States. If it is "'emphatically the province of the judicial
department to say what the law is,'" "I American citizens and resi-
dents should have the right to vindicate the public interest in compli-
ance with the law on behalf of society as a whole. Through this access
to federal forums, individuals can provide the courts with the oppor-
tunity to indeed "say what the law is."
145. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974), quoting Marbury v. Madi-
son, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
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